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Agricultural  trade  has taken on unaccustomed  prominence  in the
present multilateral  trade negotiations,  the so-called Uruguay Round
of the  General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Seven pre-
vious rounds  have resulted  in  widespread  tariff reductions  (and,
more recently, in codes of conduct  with respect to nontariff meas-
ures) for  many  nonagricultural  commodities,  but up to now  agri-
culture escaped significant  scrutiny.
GATT Principles and GATT Practices
The GATT  is  essentially  a set of rules for international  trade,  for-
mulated  by  consensus  and  enforced  through  voluntary  compliance.
When formed  in  1947,  it was to have  been part of a larger  Interna-
tional Trade Organization  (ITO),  itself intended (along with the
World Bank and the International Monetary  Fund) to be the third
pillar of the post-war  financial  order.  When formation  of the ITO
was blocked by the American  Congress,  all that remained  were the
GATT rules themselves.
While GATT's impact on trade  has not been equal to the World
Bank's on  development  aid  or the IMF's  on monetary policies,
GATT has served well as a forum for the resolution  of trade prob-
lems and for periodic  multilateral  negotiations  to liberalize  trade
rules. Its goal is a more liberalized trade, not "free trade."  The basic
premise  is equal  treatment  for domestic and imported  goods and
nondiscriminatory treatment for the goods of other GATT  members.
Those  countries that subscribe  to GATT  seem  to  do so not because
they hold much  credence  in gains-from-trade  economic  models,  but
because  they  observe  that  economic  prosperity  often  accompanies
more liberal trading.  Their reasoning is practical,  not theoretic.
Today,  GATT has ninety-six members (several of whom have  only
recently joined),  and its rules  are applied  on  a de facto basis  by an
additional  thirty-one  countries,  including  nearly  all  the  developing
nations.  As its membership  has grown,  consensus  has become  hard-
er and harder to achieve.
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use  of quantitative trade restrictions  such as quotas,  although stable
or  "bound"  tariffs  are  permitted.  Export  subsidies are  also  largely
prohibited.  In addition,  the rules prescribe valid  actions that can be
taken against dumped or harmful imports.
Despite GATT success over  the years in reducing tariffs,  in bring-
ing order to trade in industrial products, and in providing a forum
for the  discussion  and resolution  of most trade  issues,  much  of agri-
cultural trade has effectively  avoided  its disciplines.  For example,
the  GATT permits the use  of domestic quotas when  a country  is try-
ing to reduce  production and  the use of export restrictions  in  cases
of critical  domestic  shortages.  Both the  United States  and
Switzerland are specifically exempted  in large measure  from the im-
port access  rules that bind other countries.  There  are vitually  no
rules  disciplining the use of measures  that purport to protect human,
animal  or plant  health,  or  to conserve  natural resources,  even
though they clearly  can be used  as  barriers to trade.  Finally,  many
commonly used nontariff import measures such as variable levies,
minimum  import prices  and  "voluntary"  export  restraint  agree-
ments,  were  not in use at the time the GATT was drafted  and have
not come under its oversight since that time.
The deteriorating world agricultural trade situation in the early
1980s led the GATT  contracting  parties to reconsider  ways in which
to bring  the sector  under  more  operationally  effective  GATT  rules
and disciplines. The need to address all measures that directly  or in-
directly  affect  agricultural  trade,  whether  quotas,  waivers,  variable
levies,  production restrictions or export subsidies,  was made clear at
a meeting in Punta del Este,  Uruguay,  in  1986.  The  resulting decla-
ration set forth the objectives for the present multilateral  trade nego-
tiations in agriculture,  scheduled to conclude in  1990.
At the talks in Geneva,  a Negotiating  Group on Agriculture has
primary  responsibility  for the sector,  although the fourteen  other
groups (such as those  on Subsidies,  on Tariffs,  on Non-Tariff Meas-
ures,  on  Natural  Resource-Based  Products,  on  Tropical  Products,
on Dispute Settlement and on the Functioning of the GATT), may
also have a say,  especially when the time comes for trade-offs among
sectors.  At that point,  probably  not until close  to the  1990  deadline,
countries that have limited bargaining  power in the agricultural sec-
tor may seek to exert leverage  from other  sectors in which they are
more influential.
Through  August  1988,  the Negotiating  Group on  Agriculture  had
held nine formal (and a few informal)  meetings.  A technical working
group has been established  to work out  aggregate measurements  of
support,  and  another  working  group  on sanitary  and phytosanitary
restrictions  on trade  may  be created.  Specific  negotiating  positions
have been put forth by several groups of the major agricultural trad-
ing countries,  but no  agreement  has been reached.  Progress  in the
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Unresolved  Issues
Five  key issues will  dominate  the discussions  in Montreal  and the continuing negotiations in Geneva:
1.  Can  or should  short-term  or  emergency  actions  be  linked  to  a long-term agreement?
2.  Which  government actions  should  be reduced  or eliminated
and how will progress be measured?
3.  How will GATT link agricultural policy with broader  social wel- fare objectives such as food security,  environmental  quality and em- ployment  policy?
4.  How much special treatment  should  be accorded  developing countries?
5.  To what  extent  should  health  and  sanitary regulations  be allowed  to function  as trade barriers?
Short-Term Actions  and Long-Term Agreements
The most difficult  immediate  obstacle  facing  negotiators  is wheth- er and how to implement some form of "emergency"  action to allevi- ate  current subsidy  and production  pressures.  All  proposals  except that of the United  States contain  short-term elements.  Most propose a reduction  in export subsidies as well  as  action on  domestic sub- sidies and import access.
The European  Community (EC) insists that emergency  action be a precondition  for  agreement  on  the  long-term  framework.  The United  States, in direct contrast,  insists that agreement on a long- term  framework  should  precede  any  emergency  action.  The  EC proposes an  emergency one-year  commitment  on cereal  prices,  a reduction  in  sugar  exports,  maintenance  of present  access  to  tradi- tional  import  markets  for sugar,  and compliance  with  International Dairy  Arrangement  minimum  export prices.  These  would  be fol- lowed  by short-term  measures  to reduce price  supports  and to  con- trol production  in  principal  agricultural  sectors.  The  Cairns  Group has called  for short-term action as  a "downpayment"  on a longer-
term framework and is seeking to mediate the diametrically opposed U.S.  and  EC positions.  All participants  at least  agree  that the  final objective  of the negotiations is  a new set of effective  GATT rules  dis- ciplining  agricultural trade.
Permitted and Forbidden Government Actions
In line with the Punta del Este mandate,  all of the proposals on the table  would  eliminate  or reduce  domestic  support measures,  export
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when  it comes  to  specifying  which measures  should  be  addressed.
The United States wants  a complete ban on all supports except
those  that are "decoupled"  or are used for bona fide  food  aid.  The
EC proposes limitations  on the quantities  eligible  for government
support,  largely  through production  quotas.  Japan  argues that
GATT should  minimize  only the trade-distorting  effects  of domestic
policies,  while  emphasizing  that  these  policies  have  broader  social
welfare  objectives than mere trade.
The complex relationship between domestic  supports and trade
intervention  can be usefully examined  in a framework that disen-
tangles the two dimensions  of policy effects. The first is the degree  of
trade distortion resulting from  a given policy,  or trade effect.  The
second,  which emphasizes the production  or supply-response  distor-
tion  resulting from a given policy,  is  the output effect.  Trade  distor-
tions often  stem from output  distortions,  so  the effects,  while  differ-
ent,  are related.  Indeed,  it  is  hard to  think  of any  domestic
production distortion that does not alter trade positions in some way,
shape or form.
A  policy has a trade effect  if participants in the internal market
face  different  conditions  from  those in the  cross-border  market.
Such a definition encompasses  not only policies that affect the differ-
ence  between  domestic  and external  prices,  but  also barriers  such
as  protective  sanitary  regulations  that  systematically  alter  internal
and external market conditions.  The output effect arises when a pol-
icy influences production  decisions.  Such policies may be negative-
as  are U.S.  and  European  land retirement  programs that  pay pro-
ducers not to produce-or positive-as are price guarantees that pay
producers  on the basis of output.  The United  States,  EC,  and many
other countries currently engage  in both policies simultaneously.
"Decoupled"  agricultural  policies  are touted by the United  States
as measures  that have both zero output and zero trade effects.  Any
income  support-a  feature  independent  of decoupling  itself-could
be  provided  through  direct  payments,  a  positive/negative  tax
scheme,  a  minimum income  insurance  program,  or  some  combina-
tion.  In  the absence  of government  incentives  to produce  or  not  to
produce,  farmers  would  presumably  make  planting  and marketing
decisions  solely on the basis of market prices.  Still, it cannot be said
that any direct  payments  would  really have zero effects  on produc-
tion since any income  supplements could be invested in additional
production factors.
Attention  by GATT to domestic agricultural policies would be con-
sistent with the Punta del Este  declaration's  resolve  to confront  the
domestic sources  of agricultural trade protection.  Progress in the ne-
gotiations  can be defined as an agreement to move,  in each country,
toward  policies that are liberalizing overall,  in the sense that both
output and trade  distortions are reduced,  or  alternatively,  by  move-
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be bound by a common framework agreement.
By  arranging  policies  along  a continuum  of distortion,  a series  of acceptable  limits could be  set with respect  to  both trade  and output
effects  of any  given policy  (Figure  1).  All  agricultural  policies  could be required  to fall within  certain arbitrary but agreed-upon  bounds
over a stated period of time.  The purpose of the bounds would be to constrain  movement toward  more  trade  and  output neutrality.
These bounds  could  be biased  toward either positive  or negative
production  or  trade  incentives,  depending  on  the negotiated agree-
ment.  A "zero-zero"  outcome is unlikely.
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Any scheme proposing  to reduce  government  intervention  in pro- duction  or trade  decisions  requires  some  measurement  device  that
assesses  the total level  of diverse  government  support measures. The choice  of technique  should be  consistent  with the underlying
philosophy of the agreements;  in particular,  is  it to measure produc- tion distortions  or trade distortions?  Most frequently  proposed  is
some form of the Producer  Subsidy Equivalent  (PSE) recently calcu- lated for a relative handful of crops by the Organization  for Econom- ic Cooperation  and Development  (OECD).  (The job is not yet  done. There are more than 3,000 agricultural  tariff line items on record.)
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quired to compensate  producers  for a change  in policy,  is not  a di-
rect measure  of either the output or trade effects of a policy.  Rather,
it could be used as an independent check on the overall level of sub-
sidy flowing  to agricultural  producers.  It might also  prove  useful  in
monitoring  changes in support levels  if reductions  can be agreed
upon.  Variations  include  the  Trade  Distortion  Equivalent  (TDE)
proposed  by Canada and the  Support Measurement  Unit  (SMU)
proposed  by the EC.  The TDE adjusts the PSE calculation in an at-
tempt  to capture  only  the trade  distorting  components  of producer
subsidies,  while the  SMU  uses  a fixed  reference  price  to  minimize
the effects of exchange  rate fluctuations.
Some  countries, particularly Japan  and some LDCs, oppose the
use  of any such measurement devices,  arguing that they do not take
explicit account  of critical  noneconomic  objectives  of  many  agri-
cultural policies.  Too,  since no measure  can be neutral,  the PSE (or
TDE  or  SMU)  will inevitably  itself provide  incentives  for distortions
as countries figure out ways to accomplish their purposes within the
framework of whatever measuring device is implemented.
Nontrade Social  Welfare  Objectives
The European  Community,  the Nordics  (Finland, Norway,  Ice-
land, Sweden)  and Japan have repeatedly  emphasized that many
agricultural policies have extra-market  social objectives,  perhaps the
most important  of which are  food security, environmental  quality
and rural employment.  This source of resistance  is often treated as a
minor  irritant by advocates  of liberalization,  but these  objectives
may be critical  for governments trying  to "sell"  policy  reforms in
their own countries.
Some  of these concerns  might  be  diminished  by  agreement  to
move toward direct payments to farmers, as proposed  in several de-
coupling  schemes.  A  principal drawback  is that such payments  are
often deemed  "welfare  for farmers"  and are  opposed  as such by
major farm interest groups in both the United States and the EC. Di-
rect payments  might be more palatable for producers if certain non-
production  obligations  accompany  the payments.  One  politically  at-
tractive  option with sound economic justifications  is to link direct
income  supports  to a  program  of environmental  improvements,  in-
cluding  retirement  of environmentally  sensitive  lands.  Such im-
provement projects  as river and stream  improvements,  erosion
reduction  and forest  plantings  could  additionally  generate  employ-
ment in the rural sector.
Food security  adds an important  psychological  dimension to  agri-
cultural policy  in countries  where the memory of privations  is only a
generation old, as well as in those with very limited foreign reserves.
This is a tricky negotiating  point. Proponents  of trade  reform argue
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in theory,  be  accomplished  through trade  with reliable  suppliers  as
long as national  income  and hard  currency  levels  are  sufficiently
high.  Greater  assurance  against  supply  interruptions  can  be  ap-
proached through binding  GATT obligations,  but financial  con-
straints must be addressed elsewhere.
Special  Treatment for Developing  Countries
Special and  differential treatment  (S&D)  for developing  countries
is now an integral  aspect of the rights and obligations  defined in the
GATT.  Such treatment  in past negotiations  usually  took the  form of
nonreciprocity  in the  value  of concessions  exchanged  between  de-
veloped and  developing nations,  as  well as longer periods for LDCs
to  implement  trade  reforms.  The most  recent negotiating  round
(1979)  created  a  "tiered"  system  of rights  and obligations  (Aho  and
Aronson).  These  agreements,  which  essentially allow LDCs  the
rights of GATT membership without  all the corresponding  obliga-
tions,  have attracted considerable  criticism  over the years,  but their
legitimacy was stressed again  in the Punta del Este declaration.
In the current round, a group of developing  countries (particularly
the net food importers) have insisted that S&D treatment be an inte-
gral part of any agreed upon long-term framework  of rules.  They
offer few  specific  suggestions  on how this could best be  accom-
plished,  but they list  their major  goals  as a reduction  or elimination
of export  subsidies by developed  countries  without  increasing  costs
for importing LDCs;  the  maintenance  of LDC  support  measures  re-
lated to the noneconomic  objectives of agricultural policies including
employment,  structural  adjustment,  development  and food security;
and the  protection  of LDC  domestic  markets  for development  pur-
poses.
Ironically,  internal agricultural  price policies  in many LDCs dis-
criminate against producers  and artificially  depress output, so re-
moval of these policies  through GATT agreements  would be a move
in the  direction  of a  more  output-neutral  policy.  Furthermore,
reductions  in LDC export taxes  would constitute  a move  away from
negative  trade  incentives.  Therefore,  even  if  GATT allows  present
LDC domestic subsidies to be left unchanged,  the removal of present
trade  distortions  would  constitute  a net improvement  in  GATT
terms.
Health and Sanitary Regulations
Each negotiating  proposal makes reference to a reduction  in those
health  and sanitary restrictions  that act  only as barriers to trade.
Heretofore,  efforts to address this thorny problem have been largely
unsuccessful.  Several proposals  advocate  the  use of "universally  ac-
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arises  here because  agreed upon international  standards  for health
and sanitary restrictions  exist  only for  a  few  items  and none  are
binding.  Improvements  in notification  and  consultation  procedures,
and perhaps in dispute  settlement procedures,  are possible, but past
experience  shows little trade benefit from such efforts.
Direction  of the Negotiations
Heading  into the  final two  years  of the Uruguay  Round,  nego-
tiators confront both political and practical  challenges  in agriculture
(Runge).  One  important  consideration  is the capacity and the  inter-
est of a new U.S.  administration (regardless  of party) to maintain the
momentum of the first two years and to push as adamantly  for re-
form,  especially  in the context of drought-caused  short supplies  and
rising prices. Also at issue is the capacity  of the EC to make substan-
tial reforms in light of its recent bitter political battle over budget sta-
bilizer programs.  Finally,  will Japan agree to further liberalization  in
the  wake  of those  measures forced upon it by earlier dispute  settle-
ments in the face of intense domestic opposition?
The interaction of multilateral trade negotiations and domestic pol-
icy  changes  could lead to mutually  reinforcing reforms,  but a move-
ment toward  less liberal trade and greater protectionism  is also  pos-
sible  if progress  in Geneva  appears  stalled  (Paarlberg).  As  the
December  meeting  in Montreal  approaches,  the European  and U.S.
positions  seem to be  on  a collision  course.  The  EC's new  stabilizer
package  reinforces  the two-price  system of the  CAP  and  augments
the  EC budget for greater  export subsidization  should a subsidy  war
erupt.  The  strength  of the  U.S.  position-uncompromising  support
for liberalization-is also its weakness;  it is considered  completely
unrealistic  by many  other parties,  and no negotiating  fall-back posi-
tion is apparent  at this point.  The U.S. administration  has focused
most  of its GATT attention on events in Geneva and Washington.
Despite assurances to the contrary by U.S. negotiators,  there is little
evidence  that major agricultural and nonagricultural interests are
solidly behind the U.S. position.
Incentives  exist  for  either  the  advocates  of  "liberalization"  (lead
by the United  States) or the advocates of "realism"  (lead by the EC)
to walk out  of the negotiations.  Either side could justify  its action as
consistent  with the true objectives  of  GATT.  Deadlocks  can be
broken  of course  and the  self-imposed  1990  negotiating  deadline
could encourage compromise  fairly soon.
As  negotiators  move  from high principles  to  specific  policies,it
seems prudent that the U.S.  administration  open the trade  liber-
alization  debate  to  a broader  spectrum of American  public  opinion.
This would be a particularly  apt role  for policy educators  in general
and for the Extention Service in particular.
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the  board,  for  example,  together  with a  relaxation  of present  U.S. supply control measures,  have been suggested  as a way to punish in- tractable  European  interests.  Removing  acreage  from  set-asides could improve the U.S.  competitive  position considerably  (especially
if a targeting scheme were adopted  bringing low-cost and nonero-
sion-prone  acres back into production  first),  but an increase  in mar- keting  loans  would  be  tantamount to  protectionist export  restitu-
tions,  placing the  United States on a par with the EC  as a subsidizer of exports.  The United  States  can stay consistent  with its current
pro-liberalization  approach  and argue that reducing  set-asides leads to greater  output neutrality.  No such rationalization  appears possible for marketing loans.
Finally,  the scheduled completion of the Uruguay Round coincides with the EC's own 1990 integration  of capital markets,  a process with some  similarities  to the  recent  American interstate  banking  experi-
ence.  Capital  integration  is  a  scheduled  milepost  on the  way to full European  economic  integration  by  1992.  Integration  within  the  EC could lead to greater protectionism  aimed at non-EC countries,  to the detriment of the principles of the GATT negotiations.
Summary
Five areas  of concern  are sure to be discussed-and  really have to be resolved-in upcoming GATT negotiations.  First, some  resolution
of short- versus long-run reforms must be made.  Second,  it appears that movement toward  less trade-  and output-distorting  policies  will
remain a core concept.  Policies should be measured  and ranked ac- cording  to  their relative  distorting  effects,  both for production  and trade,  allowing  acceptable  bounds  to be established  as a basis for further  negotiation.
Third,  the social welfare  objectives of agricultural  policies must be squarely  addressed so that all negotiators  can report to their constit-
uents (both commodity and  consumer  groups)  that they have  gotten a  "fair  deal"  in  GATT.  If,  for example,  the  ultimate  agreement  in- volves some form of decoupling, then decoupling must be acceptable
to farm and nonfarm publics alike.  Nor can the issue of food security
be sidestepped;  it  will be  important  to  guarantee  supplies  to  major
importers,  consistent with the rules of GATT.
Fourth,  offers  of access  and,  if necessary,  special and differential
treatment for  LDCs will  likely be made.  There  are risks  in  this ap- proach.  If developing  countries  are exempted from too many  GATT disciplines,  the  major  players  like  the  United  States  and  the  EC might  decide  to move  outside GATT  to  conduct their own  agri- cultural  negotiations,  closing  off LDC  market  access  in the  process. GATT must  also  remain  sensitive to  IMF  and World  Bank attmepts
172to have  LDCs discipline  their own pricing policies,  but GATT-im-
posed  reductions  in LDC  trade  distortions  may  eventually  be  even
more  important  to  developing  country growth  than are  domestic
pricing reforms.
Fifth  and finally,  there  is potential  for  long,  drawn-out  and ex-
ceedingly  complex  talks over  health and  sanitary  regulations.  This
area  has  the potential  to become  a  real negotiating bog  (not unlike
the  PSE),  stalling progress  on other  issues.  Beyond  general  agree-
ments  to pursue more uniform regulatory standards  and to improve
notification  and consultation  procedures,  it will be exceedingly  diffi-
cult  to achieve  major  health and  sanitary accords  in this round.  At
best,  the groundwork for future negotiations might be laid.
The Uruguay Round involves  fourteen other negotiating areas  be-
sides  agriculture;  important  cross-cutting  deals will  utimately  be
made.  Negotiations  involve  the translation  of principles  into details,
and it  is  detail  upon which  deals  are made.  This round  is being re-
garded  as  a make-or-break  event.  Its outcome  will  affect  domestic
agricultural  policies  in  much  of the world.  Liberalizing  agricultural
trade  will  require  political courage  and practical  diplomacy,  but
failure  to  make progress  will result in enormous  costs to importers,
exporters,  producers and consumers in the North and South alike.
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